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State Constitutional Protection for
Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions*
Paul Marcus**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A great debate has been raging in recent years concerning the application of state constitutional law in state criminal prosecutions. For
many years, state constitutional provisions were essentially ignored with
the entire emphasis placed on federal applications of the United States
Constitution. In the last twenty years, however, many state judges have
looked to their own state constitutions to determine if sufficient protections have been given to criminal defendants in state prosecutions.
In this article, I shall look at this important development, focus on the
debate about the propriety of the expanding scope of state constitutional
law, and also review the relatively modest contribution which has been
made by the Arizona courts.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

The first eight amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
provide substantial protection to individuals in criminal prosecutions.
Found within these amendments are protections relating to searches, 1
the privilege against self-incrimination,2 the right to a speedy trial, 3 the
right to counsel,4 the ability to confront witnesses, 5 and the right to
avoid cruel and unusual punishment. 6 Early in our jurisprudential
history, however, the United States Supreme Court made clear that
these protections were to be applied only to the federal government
and not to the states.

• Copyright 1988 Paul Marcus.
•• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971,
University of California at Los Angeles.
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
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In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,? the Court
refused to extend these protections beyond the precise language of the
amendments, which apparently limited their application to the federal
government. It was only with the passage of the fourteenth amendment,
particularly the due process clause, that a basis was created so as to
apply these protections to the states. Even then, it took almost a full
century until many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were applied
to the states in criminal cases. The fourteenth amendment was passed
in 1868, but cases such as Gideon, 8 Miranda, 9 and Mapp 10 were not
decided until the 1960s. Thus, for most of the history of this country,
the principal constitutional protection for individual defendants in
criminal cases was not found under federal constitutional law. Instead,
it was state law-both constitutional and statutory-that generally
governed criminal cases. The states, however, generally construed protections for criminal defendants narrowly. Although a broader application of state constitutional law in criminal cases may now be among
"the most significant current development[s] in our constitutional
jurisprudence," 11 it is of very recent vintage indeed. Justice Mosk of the
California Supreme Court has effectively argued that an approach
requiring state courts to look to state constitutions in criminal cases is
not only appropriate, but historically based. He made the point clearly:
Don't let anyone tell you state constitutions are redundant, even
when their texts are similar to the federal Constitution. State charters
do not get their inspiration from the U.S. Constitution. It was the
converse: The Framers of the federal charter adopted almost all of
the Bill of Rights from the charters of the original states. 12

Many distinguished judges, both federal and state, have called upon
state judges to look first to their state constitutions to determine whether
7. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See generally Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1985).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (giving a right to counsel under the sixth
amendment for defendants, at trial, in serious felony cases).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings, under the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, for interrogation which results in statements given in response
to custodial interrogation).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the fourth amendment search and seizure
provision, along with the fourteenth amendment due process clause, to exclude evidence in state
criminal prosecutions).
11. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 707 (1983).
12. Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CAL. LAw. 100 (1987). Judge Wright of the District
of Columbia Circuit cheered "state judges who have resumed their historic role as the primary
defenders of civil liberties and equal rights." Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of
a Federal Judge, 11 HAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 165, 188 {1984).
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violations have occurred in criminal cases. Justice Brennan of the United
States Supreme Court has written:
State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the
full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too,
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending
beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretations of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed. 13

Since the beginning of our country, state constitutional provlSlons
have always existed as independent grounds upon which to decide cases.
States have always been free to grant more protection to individual
defendants than that given by the federal constitution. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that "a state is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity
than those this Court holds to be ne.cessary upon federal constitutional
standards." 14
This freedom has existed for almost two hundred years; the broader
application of state constitutional law in criminal cases is, however, of
very recent vintage. Two principal explanations have been offered. The
first, and less cynical of the two, is that with so much activity by the
federal courts in the two decades beginning in the early sixties, little

13. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv.
489, 491 (1977). The point was echoed by Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court:
It once again is becoming familiar learning that the federal Bill of Rights was drawn
from the earlier state declarations of rights adopted at the time of independence,
that most protection of people's rights against their own states entered the federal
Constitution only in the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860's, and that it took
another hundred years and much disputed reasoning to equate most of the first
eight amendments with due process under the fourteenth.
Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 174 (1984).
Because the state protections existed prior to the Bill of Rights, Judge Newman refers to the
current trend as "old federalism" in response to the labeling of this development as "new
federalism." See Newman, The "Old Federalism": Protection of Individual Rights by State
Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CoNN. L. REv. 21 (1982).
14. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original). See also Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("[We do not] limit the authority of the State
to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the [f]ederal Constitution."). See generally
O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) ("The states may, as the United States
Supreme Court has often recognized, afford their citizens greater protection than the safeguards
guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the states are 'independently responsible for
safeguarding the rights of their citizens.' "); Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153.
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room was left for state creativity in the criminal justice area. 15 And,
of course, very little activity occurred prior to the early sixties in either
federal or state courts in terms of applying constitutional protections
to defendants in criminal cases. 16 The other explanation is simply that
the states were, until recently, generally not interested in providing
constitutional protections and remedies for defendants in criminal cases.
Justice Linde has argued that most state courts did not take seriously
individual rights and liberties set out in state constitutions:
State courts issued and still issue gag orders against the press without
much concern whether their constitutions guarantee freedom to
speak, write, or publish on any subject whatever. State courts did
not probe very deeply into what a state's promise of equal privileges
and immunities might mean for blacks or for women. Issues such
as prayer in the public schools or trials without counsel and the use
of illegally seized evidence did not rank high among the state courts'
prioritiesY

Problems arose even when state courts appeared to be relying, at
least in part, on state constitutional guarantees. That is, if a state court
resolved a criminal case looking to both federal and state constitutional
provisions, the Supreme Court on review could not easily determine
whether to resolve the matter on a substantive basis. If the case truly
involved federal law, of course, the Supreme Court felt obliged to
consider it. On the other hand, if the state decision gave the defendant
more protection under the state constitution than provided by the federal
constitution, the matter was not reviewable. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long18 made clear that it will not
review cases where there are independent and adequate state grounds
offered. The Court urged state judges, however, to clarify whether the
state court opinion was one which rests "primarily on federal law [or
is] interwoven with the federal law." 19

15. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1147. Justice Abrahamson noted that in the 1960s "it was
almost as if state constitution law had disappeared."
16. Of course, there were numerous exceptions for the truly egregious cases in which general
due process violations occurred. The most obvious examples are found in the confession cases
where the conduct of the police was viewed as sufficiently shocking so as to render the confessions
unlawful. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (suspects tied and beaten prior to
confessing); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S 413 (1967) (defendant kept in small room with no bed
or other furnishings and minimal food prior to confessing); Lynumm v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963) (the defendant spoke in response to threats that her children would be taken away from
her).
17. Linde, supra note 13, at 174.
18. 463 u.s. 1032 (1983).
19. Id. at 1040. Justice Brennan in an earlier law review article explained:
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Some state courts have vigorously followed the language of the United
States Supreme Court in many criminal justice situations by vigorously
applying state constitutional provisions in criminal prosecutions. The
most telling example is undoubtedly the South Dakota Supreme Court,s
decision in State v. Opperman. 20 The first time the state court dealt
with the issue of warrantless inventory searches of automobiles, it found
that the police procedure was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. The United States Supreme Court disagreed. 21 The state supreme
court then granted a rehearing and determined that the inventory search
specifically violated the individual,s rights under the South Dakota
constitution, with the court noting that it was
under no compulsion to follow the United States Supreme Court in
that regard. . . . There can be no doubt that this court has the
power to provide an individual with greater protection under the
state constitution than does the United States Supreme Court under
the federal constitution. This court is the !mal authority on interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota Constitution. We
have always assumed the independent nature of our state constitution regardless of any similarity between the language of that
document and the federal constitution. 22

The message has now become clear-state courts have an obligation
to view their state constitutional provisions independent of the federal
provisions. Moreover, they may be obliged to conduct that inquiry
prior to any review of federal law. State judges throughout the United
States are voicing this view strongly. A few comments are illustrative.
Justice Quinn of the Colorado Supreme Court wrote: "We are not
bound by the United States Supreme Court,s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment when determining the scope of state constitutional
protections. , 23
Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: "[t]he
federal constitution establishes minimum rather than maximum guar-

And of course state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state
law need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants
access to the courts. Moreover, the state decisions not only cannot be overturned
by, they indeed are not even reviewable by, the Supreme Court of the United States.
We are utterly without jurisdiction to review such state decisions.
Brennan, supra note 13, at 501.
20. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
21. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
22. 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). The language of the South Dakota constitution was,
in the state court's words, "almost identical to that found in the Fourth Anlendment." Id.
23. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo. 1983).
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antees of individual rights, and the state courts independently determine,
according to their own law (generally their own state constitutions), the
nature of the protection of the individual against state government. " 24
Justice Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court said: "[b]ecause a state
constitution may afford enhanced protection for individual liberties, we
'should not uncritically adopt federal constitutional interpretations for
the New Jersey Constitution merely for the sake of consistency.' " 25
To be sure, quite a number of judges now look back to the language
of Justice Brandeis, which they view as applicable to judicial decision
making, although it was originally intended to deal with legislative activities; "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel. social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country. " 26
III.

THE NATIONAL APPLICATION

In a host of non-criminal cases, we have seen much activity by state
supreme courts in recent years in which state constitutional law principles have been applied to provide greater protection to individuals
than the federal law. The cases range from activism in enforcing churchstate separation27 to protecting interests of the mentally ill.28 The most
widely heralded case, however, comes very recently from the Oregon
Supreme Court dealing with obscenity. The court in State v. Henry29
received an appeal from a defendant who had been convicted, under a
state obscenity statute, of disseminating obscene material. The court
discussed at length whether the materials would be found unlawfully
obscene in a federal prosecution; it particularly looked to the United
States Supreme Court's definition of obscenity as found in the numerous

24. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153.
25. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 99, 519 A.2d 820, 823 (1987) (citing State v. Hunt,
91 N.J. 338, 355, 450 A.2d 952, 969 (1982)).
26. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
discussed in Pollock, supra note 11, at 717. The debate over the proper role and application of
state constitutional law has been intense from the very beginning of this period of "new federalism"
(or "old federalism" if you prefer). See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272,
127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), where the majority and the dissenters vigorously debated the proper
application of state law vis-a-vis federal law. See infra text accompanying notes 81-104.
27. See Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State
Through State Constitutional Provisions, 7l VA. L. REv. 625, 634 (1985).
28. See Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 39-40 (1982).
29. 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
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cases handed down over the last 30 years. 30 The real question for the
Oregon court, however, was not the United States Supreme Court's
definition of obscenity, but whether the state statute violated the free
speech clause of the Oregon constitution. 31 Oregon's free speech clause
is somewhat broader than the federal first amendment: "No law shall
be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right. " 32
For the Oregon court, the chief analysis related to its own interpretation of the Oregon constitution, apart from any first amendment
analysis which had previously been given by the United States Supreme
Court. The court made clear that it would only "discuss the federal
constitution and federal cases when of assistance in the analysis of the
Oregon Constitution. " 33 Upon reviewing the language of the state
constitution, as well as Oregon history, the court took a very broad
view of the freedom of speech protected in Oregon. The court found
that even if the expression had been viewed as obscene under the United
States Supreme Court test, such a characterization would not
deprive it of protection under the Oregon constitution .... We
emphasize that the prime reason that "obscene" expression cannot
be restricted is that it is speech that does not fall within any
historical exception to the plain wording of the Oregon Constitution
that "no law shall be passed restraining the expression of [speech]
freely on any subject whatsoever." 34

Recognizing the narrow protection offered by the United States Supreme
Court, the Oregon court nevertheless took a much- different view, relying
exclusively on the Oregon constitution: "In this state any person can
write, print, read, say, show or sell anything to a consenting adult even
though that expression may be generally or universally considered
'obscene.' " 35
Although much broad movement has occurred in numerous areas of
substantive law, the most dramatic developments have been in the
criminal justice field. A variety of reasons has been offered for this,
but the most attractive explanation relates to United States Supreme
Court developments over the past twenty-five years. In the 1960s, when

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
OR. CONST. art I, § 8.
Jd.

302 Or. at 515, 732 P.2d at 11.
Jd. at 525, 732 P.2d at 17.
Jd. at 525, 732 P.2d at 18.
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the Supreme Court was expanding the protections offered to individual
defendants under the United States Constitution, 36 the state courts
engaged in little activity independent of the federal constitution. As
Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, "the
state courts said little in the 1960s . . . it was almost as if state
constitutions had disappeared. " 37 When the composition of the Court
changed and the Warren Court became the Burger Court, rulings in
the constitutional criminal procedure area also changed. Limitations
were imposed on Miranda, 38 and the exclusionary rule as originally
enunciated in Mapp, 39 and a narrow reading was given to Gideon v.
Wainwright. 40
Many state judges, who had grown up professionally with the dictates
of the Warren Court, recoiled against the Burger Court's narrow reading
of these precedents. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "there has been
an unmistakable trend in the Court to read the guarantees of individual
liberty restrictively, which means that the content of the rights applied
to the states is likewise diminished. " 41 Justice Brennan has argued that
more and more state courts are writing to support the defense view of
broader state constitutional protection. "And state courts have taken
seriously their obligation as coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties."42 For Justice Brennan, the development is a very positive one and

36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing the warnings requirement
under the fifth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule
under the fourth amendment to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (broadening the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel).
37. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1147.
38. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements in violation of Miranda
can be used at trial for impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand and makes a
statement inconsistent with the earlier one); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Miranda
does not apply to statements where the questioning by the police officers was for purposes of
protecting public safety rather than to obtain incriminating comments); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977) (Miranda does not apply where the defendant was questioned at a police station
but was free to leave).
39. The two main cases limiting Mapp are Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (the Supreme
Court rejected precise criteria for the determination of the validity of an affidavit in support of
a search warrant and instead directed magistrates to make "common sense" determinations), and
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (the Court would not exclude evidence obtained as a
result of a search in which the police officers relied, in reasonable good faith, on a warrant that
later turned out to be invalid).
40. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (the Court held that
Gideon would not apply to cases in which the defendant did not receive a term of imprisonment
as a penalty); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (the Court refused to extend the right to
counsel to cases involving discretionary appeals).
41. Brennan, The Bill of Rights in the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547 (1986).
42. Id. at 548.
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directly traceable to the line of cases where the Court stepped back
from the broader holdings of the Warren Court in the criminal justice
field. 43

A.

The Search and Seizure Issue

Whatever the particular observation or explanation which may be in
vogue at the moment, the reality of the rapid development of state
constitutional law in the criminal law area cannot be disputed. In some
of the earlier cases, the state courts were hesitant to strike out on their
own under the state constitutions; even when they did they tended to
"rely heavily on general federal doctrines. " 44 More recently, however,
state judges have been highly critical of federal doctrine as unduly
limiting individual rights and protections in the criminal justice field.
The trend can be discerned from a review of cases geographically as
well as by subject. There are far too many cases which can be considered
here to make the point clearly.45 They range from opinions exploring
fairly narrow questions arising under the search and seizure provisions
of state and federal constitutions, 46 to much broader search

43. Of late, however, more and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.
This is surely an important and highly significant development for our constitutional
jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism. I suppose it was only natural that
when during the 1960's our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming
increasingly federalized, state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if
any, were secured by state constitutions. It is not easy to pinpoint why state courts
are now beginning to emphasize the protections of their states' own bills of rights.
It may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that these state courts discern,
and disagree with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court
to pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the enforcement of the
... application of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Brennan, supra note 13, at 495. See also Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident
to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1982) (discussing the movement of the state courts in
response to the "Court's continual amendment of the Warren Court precedents over the past
decade . . . ").
44. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 1324, 1494 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
45. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 7; Linde, supra note 13; Developments, supra
note 44.
46. See, e.g., State v. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 737 P.2d 1297 (1987) (under the
state constitution defendant's privacy rights were violated when the police officers obtained
defendant's unpublished telephone listing without a warrant); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815
(Colo. 1985) (police could not use homing transmitters under the Colorado constitution because
"the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of
privacy interest than does its federal counterpart.")
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questions, 47 to difficult problems surrounding statements obtained from
suspects, 48 to questions exploring the reach of the counsel requirement
under state and federal constitutions. 49
I offer here, however, three very different cases from three very
different parts of the country. The substantive legal issues all arise
under the search and seizure provisions in the state and federal constitutions, and each of the cases emphasizes the state review of the
problem.
1.

The Massachusetts Decision

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was faced with a challenge
concerning warrantless surveillance when a "one-party consent" had
been obtained in Commonwealth v. Blood. 50 A one-party consent
typically involves an informer who is "wired" for sound and then
engages in a conversation with the defendant. The conversation contains
incriminating remarks and is ultimately used against the defendant. The
United State Supreme Court has consistently held that such activity is
beyond the protective reach of the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 51 In essence, the Court has decided that the taping
of such conversations does "not invade the defendant's constitutionally
justifiable expectations of privacy." 52 The Massachusetts court acknowl-

47. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984) (declining to
follow, under the state constitution, the United States Supreme Court's Gates decision for a
"totality of circumstances" review of an affidavit's validity); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346
A.2d 66 (1975) (requiring police officers to warn suspects of their right to refuse warrantless
searches, contradicting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 u.s. 218 (1973)).
48. A classic-and early-opinion is People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127
Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), where the court rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which had allowed a defendant to be impeached with
a statement which was otherwise inadmissible under Miranda. See also Hillard v. State, 406 A.2d
415 (Md. Ct. App. 1979) (considering the inadmissibility of an incriminating declaration under
Maryland law, independent of the federal Constitution).
49. Probably the most significant early case is Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977),
where the court refused to follow United States Supreme Court restrictions on the application of
right to counsel provisions in the line-up setting. In particular, the court rejected the Supreme
Court's decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), where it had been held that the sixth
amendment did not attach until the defendant had been formally charged with a criminal offense;
thus the defendant was not entitled to counsel at a pre-indictment line up. The Blue court
determined that a criminal defendant was entitled to counsel in connection with a pretrial
identification proceeding as soon as he had been arrested.
50. 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987).
51. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971).
52. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
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edged contrary United States Supreme Court precedent, but looked
instead to the protections offered under article 14 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, which is worded in a similar fashion. 53 The
question was whether, under Massachusetts law, "society at large would
think it reasonable for the defendants to expect that, in normal course,
conversations held in private homes will not be broadcast and recorded
surreptitiously. " 54 Strongly adopting the reasoning of the dissenters in
United States v. White, 55 the Massachusetts court concluded that state
law gave considerably more protection than did federal law. The Blood
court further stated:
[I]t is not just the right to a silent, solitary autonomy which is
threatened by electronic surveillance: It is the right to bring thoughts
and emotions forth from the self in company with others doing
likewise, the right to be known to others and to know them, and
thus to be whole as a free member of a free society. 56

53. The Massachusetts search and seizure provision states:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures,
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore,
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer,
to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or
to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the person
or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
54. 400 Mass. at 68·69, 507 N.E.2d at 1033.
55. See 401 U.S. at 768 (especially Justice Harlan's opinion).
56. 400 Mass. at 69, 507 N.E.2d at 1034. The dissenting judges in Blood vigorously disagreed
with the court, but not on the question of whether state law ought to be applied differently from
federal law. Instead, the question the dissenters raised was whether Article 14 applied to the
situation.
This statute represents a modem response to a modem problem. The Framers of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights did not foresee the development of electronic
surveillance just as they could not imagine the formation of highly organized and
disciplined criminal groups. They did, however, intend that art. 14 and the other
provisions provide the framework in which the republican ideals of liberty and order
could flourish. But the court demands a liberal interpretation of art. 14 so that
modern privacy rights are protected, while it insists upon a narrow reading when
the needs of modern law enforcement are considered. In the guise of protecting
privacy, it only protects those who are its greatest threat.
Id. at 81, 507 N.E.2d at 1040 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, en bane, strongly agreed with the result in Blood. In
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, __ Pa. Super. __ , 535 A.2d 354 (1987) the court found a
warrant was required under article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because "no citizen
should have to expect that the government may immediately and irrevocably seize his private
thoughts every time he voices them to another person." Id. at _ _ , 535 A.2d at 360.
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The Colorado Decision

In People v. Sporleder, 57 the trial court had suppressed evidence
obtained by the use of a pen register. 58 The exact issue had previously
come before the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland,
where the Court found that there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in connection with these telephone numbers and hence no search
had occurred under the fourth amendment. 59 The Colorado court on
appeal began its opinion by recognizing that article 2, section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution was "substantially similar to its federal counterpart. " 60 Still, the court had on numerous occasions made clear that
it was not required to follow the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fourth amendment when determining the scope of
the state constitutional protection. 61 The court considered whether,
under the state constitution, the defendant could have a reasonable
expectation that the number that she dialed on her phone would remain
free from government intrusion, absent a showing of probable cause
and a warrant. 62 Although other states had taken a different view under
their own state constitutions, 63 the Colorado court concluded that a
citizen could properly have an expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers and such an expectation would be reasonable. The court cited
with approval the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v.

57. 666 P .2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
58. A pen register is a device that can record numbers that are dialed on a telephone by
monitoring electrical impulses that result from the dial on the phone being released. The register
does not, however, record or monitor the actual phone conversation. 666 P.2d at 137.
59. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Court specifically held that the use of a pen register did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 741-43.
60. 666 P.2d at 140. This surely was an understatement. Article 2, Section 7 of the Colorado
constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any
person or things shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person
or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
CoLO. CONST. art II, § 7.
61. 666 P.2d at 140. In Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980), the court
rejected United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and held that a bank depositor did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in deposits slips and checks which were voluntarily given to the
banks and exposed to bank employees during the normal course of business. Id. at 1120-21.
62. 666 P.2d at 141.
63. See, e.g., Indiana Bell Tel. v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 1980); Rastetter v. Behan,
639 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1982); People v. Guerra, 116 Misc. 2d 272, 455 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1982). The
Colorado court found the reasoning in these cases to be "unpersuasive for the very same reason
we find unconvincing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland." 666
P.2d at 142-43 n.6.
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HuntM where it was held that the individual had a constitutionally

protected privacy interest in the phone company's billing records for
his telephone:
It is unrealistic to say that the cloak of privacy has been shed

because the telephone company and some of its employees are aware
of this information. Telephone calls cannot be made except through
the telephone company's property and without payment to it for
the service. This disclosure has been necessitated because of the
nature of the instrumentality, but more significantly the disclosure
has been for a limited business purpose and not for release to other
persons for other reasons. The toll billing record is part of the
privacy package. 6s

3. The New Jersey Decision
A recent, and highly controversial, state court decision explicitly
rejecting a major United States Supreme Court opinion in the search
and seizure area is State v. Novembrino. 66 In Novembrino, the court
reviewed whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Leon 61 would be accepted under the New Jersey state constitution. The Supreme Court in Leon had rendered one of the major
fourth amendment decisions of recent years when it held that evidence
obtained as a result of a search would not be excluded if the police
officer had, in good faith, reasonably relied on a warrant which turned
out to be defective. 68 The New Jersey court considered the issue under
its own constitutional provision, recognizing that it should not "uncritically adopt federal constitutional interpretations for the New Jersey
constitution merely for the sake of consistency. " 69 The court also echoed
numerous statements of other courts that the state constitutional provisions may be a source of "individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the federal constitution. " 70 Although the language
of the New Jersey constitution on point was "virtually identical" to
that of the federal fourth amendment, the court refused to adopt the

64. 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
65. Id. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956, quoted in People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 142.
66. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
67. 468 u.s. 897 (1984).
68. Id. at 922.
69. 105 N.J. 98, 519 A.2d at 823 (citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 355, 450 A.2d 952, 969
(1982) (Pashman, J ., concurring)).
70. Id. at 124, 519 A.2d at 849 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980)).
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decision in Leon. Instead, the court held that the Leon rule "would
tend to undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed standard of probable cause, and in the process disrupt the highly effective procedures
employed by our criminal justice system to accommodate that constitutional guarantee without impairing law enforcement .... " 71 The court
concluded by noting the disruption brought by Leon ''may reach such
a level as to cause the [United States Supreme] Court to reconsider its
experiment with the fourth amendment. " 72

B.

The State Cases

The Massachusetts, Colorado, and New Jersey cases are striking in
the clarity of their reliance on state constitutional language even when
the wording of the state provisions is "almost identical to that found
in the [federal constitution]. " 73 The movement toward reliance on state
constitutions is, however, very recent, 74 in response to the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' limitations of the criminal procedure decisions of
the Warren Court. 75 Still, the movement is unmistakable, and almost
unstoppable. 76 Some state judges have disagreed with the movement
and strongly criticized different courses of action when the language of
the state and federal constitutions is similar and where there appears
to be no specific historical basis for different results. 77 Moreover,

71. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 132, 519 A.2d at 857.
72. Id.
73. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). Even with virtually identical
language and with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court absolutely clear (the court,
after all, was given the case a second time for proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision earlier) the South Dakota court held that it was the "final authority on
interpretation and enforcement of the South Dakota constitution." It then rejected the United
States Supreme Court's earlier decision finding that inventory searches did not violate the fourth
amendment. Id.
74. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of
Expression, 33 KAN. L. REv. 305, 306 (1985).
75. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153.
76. The number of state court decisions in recent years applying state constitutional principles
has dramatically risen. Collins, et al, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights
Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 599 (1986). For an interesting
ten year perspective, see Brennan, supra note 13, and Brennan, supra note 41.
77. In People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), the
majority of the California Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 221 (1971) (Miranda does not apply to impeachment use of earlier statements).
The dissenting justices vigorously attacked the court's application of the state constitution which
had language virtually identical to that found in the United States Constitution.
The very obvious and substantial identity of phrasing in the two Constitutions
strongly suggests to me the wisdom, insofar as possible, of identity of interpretation
of those clauses .... [N]o special, unique, or distinctive California conditions exist
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heeding the advice of some judges/8 a few states have amended their
constitutions to provide either that the state language cannot be construed to provide more protection for the citizens of that state than
the U.S. Constitution would provide, or that rather severe restrictions
will be placed on the exclusion of evidence which contravenes such
provisions. 79 In still other states, proposals are pending to limit the
state constitution. 80 Nevertheless, the trend toward expanding the use
of state constitutional provisions for protection of defendants appears
almost certain now. 81
IV.

APPLYING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The debate over the application of state constitutional provlSlons
does not simply rest with the question of whether such provisions ought
to be applied in the face of federal law. Instead, there are are also the
questions of how one applies such provisions, when those provisions
are to be applied, and the kinds of limitations that should be imposed.

which justify a departure from a general principle favoring uniformity. In my view,
in the absence of very strong counter-veiling circumstances, we should defer to the
leadership of the nation's highest court in its interpretation of nearly identical
constitutional language, rather than attempt to create a separate echelon of state
constitutional interpretations to which we will avert whenever a majority of this
court differ from a particular high court interpretation. The reason for the foregoing
principle is that it promotes uniformity and harmony in the area of the law which
peculiarly and uniquely requires them. The alternative required by the majority must
inevitably lead to growth of a shadow tier of dual constitutional interpretations state
by state which, with temporal variances, will add complexity to an already complicated body of law.
16 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 545 P.2d at 283-84, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72 (Richardson, J., dissenting}.
78. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in F1orida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983}, criticized
the state court's interpretation of state laws requiring greater protection for individual defendants
than the federal constitution as not being "rational law enforcement." He went on to point out
that the citizens of that state could amend the state constitution to reverse state court opinions
which extended individual rights. For a denunciation of the former Chief Justice's position, see
the statement made by a dissenting justice in State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 264 (Mont. 1983}:
"the arrogance of a concurring opinion in Florida v. Casal. ... The Chief Justice of the United
States did not agree with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and suggested the United
States Supreme Court was the sole repository of judicial wisdom and rationality." For further
discussion of this criticism, see infra text accompanying notes 81-111.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
80. There is much discussion in Arizona at this point in time. Without question, this discussion
comes up not as a matter of general constitutional interpretation, but as a result of criticism of
a few Arizona Supreme Court cases which appear to give criminal defendants greater rights under
the state constitution than would be given under the federal constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 112-151.
81. See Note, Individual Rights and State Constitutional Interpretations: Putting First Things
First, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 496, 497-98 (1985}. See generally Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614,
625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981}.
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At this point, state courts have taken four basic approaches to deal
with claims that arise in criminal cases under both federal and state
constitutional provisions. The first, and most restrictive, is simply a
declaration by a state court that it will not apply a state constitutional
provision in a manner different from a similar and parallel federal
rule. 82 While not followed widely, it has become the model of various
attempts to amend state constitutions so as to restrict independent
interpretation. 83
Another restricted view of the role of the state constitution is taken
in a few states which actually consider state and federal claims in
separate portions of a single opinion. 84 As noted by Justice Linde, the
approach makes the discussion of the federal claim pure dicta when
the state claim succeeds "[and] implies that the result could not be
changed by amending the state constitution. " 85
A much broader scope of review was made most famous in a series
of cases decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Here the court
looked initially to the federal rules. If the federal doctrine does not
provide sufficient protection, then-but only then-the state court will
look to the parallel state constitutional provision. 86 The difficulty with
this approach 87 is that reliance on federal law may prevent an orderly
and-again in Justice Linde's words-coherent development of the
state's independent review of its own constitutionallaw. 88
The broadest view is that the state court should look to its own law
''before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard,
so that no federal issue is properly reached when the state's law protects
the claimed right. " 89 This way, the court can look to the precise
language of the state court rules, the tradition and history within its
own boundaries, and the policies shared by citizens of that state. 90

82. This is the position strongly taken by Chief Justice Lucas of the California Supreme
Court. See infra note 99.
83. Note, supra note 81, at 507. Of course, the most striking example is the Florida experience.
The Florida constitution was amended in 1982 to require that the state constitutional exclusionary
rule be interpreted in no broader fashion than is found in the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 12. See generally Florida v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla.
1987).
84. See, e.g., State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982).
85. Linde, supra note 13, at 178.
86. /d.
87. Often called the "supplemental" or "interstial" approach. See generally Linde, supra
note 13, at 175-79.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1153.
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The strongest proponents of independent state review of state constitutional provisions have vigorously argued in support of the approach
requiring primary state constitutional review. 91 In their eyes, the result
is correct either because ''there has been an unmistakable trend in the
[United States Supreme] Court to read the guarantees of individual
liberty restrictively" 92 or because it allows for a truly independent
development of state law. 93 Such a broad approach, however, has come
under increasing criticism in recent years. Some contend that having
individual states requiring different standards for law enforcement
results in a constitutional system which does not promote "rational law
enforcement. " 94 Others assert that it will encourage individual states to
resort to the amendment process to bring state constitutional doctrine
into line with the prevailing federal view. 95 Powerful arguments have
been advanced that state constitutional provisions should generally track
the federal provisions when the language in both is sufficiently close,
or there is an absence of clear historical reasons to require different
treatment. On the former argument, then-Chief Justice Erickson's opinion
in Colorado v. SporledeTJ6 is probably the leading statement.
The United States Supreme Court may err in its interpretation of
the Constitution and should not be followed blindly by courts which
disagree with the high Court's analysis. Lower courts, however,
should explain their divergences from the interpretation of higher
appellate courts in reaching different conclusions. Courts which fail
to explain important divergences from precedent run the risk of
being accused of making policy decisions based on subjective resultoriented reasons. . . . I do believe, however, that courts should be
hesitant in interpreting identical language in state constitutions
differently in their efforts to reach conclusions which differ from
the United States Supreme Court.... [I] would be less quick than
the majority in applying the Colorado Constitution to situations
where there is no significant textual difference from its federal
counterpart. 97

91. Justices Shirley Abrahamson and Hans Linde have been the most visible-and vocaladvocates.
92. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547 (1986).
93. For a good discussion of the numerous cases which emphasize this point, see Abrahamson,
supra note 7, at 1172. See also Goldberg, Stanley Mosk: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 HAsTINGS
CoNST. L.Q. 395, 401-02 (1985); Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest,
68 VA. L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1982).
94. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
95. Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1154.
96. 666 P .2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
97. Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting). See also Chief Justice
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The argument concerning historical bases was made forcefully by
Justice Garibaldi, dissenting from the New Jersey Supreme Court's
rejection of the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
doctrine in New Jersey v. Novembrino. 98 There he searched in vain for
such historical or policy reasons which would distinguish New Jersey
from the national experience. He argued that state law should follow
federal rules unless one could point to prevailing historical or policy
reasons. 99
The criticism over expanding state development of state constitutional
provisions may be vigorous, but it has not prevailed generally. Over
the last decade, the trend has been toward greater reliance on state
constitutional provisions at the expense of uniformity in law enforcement and general deference to United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution. Many judges, lawyers and
commentators strongly support such a movement, contending that for
both historical and policy reasons, the state judiciary should not be
restricted in its independent interpretation of state constitutional doctrine:
Just as state courts need not pursue the chimera of completely
autonomous state constitutional doctrines, neither need they confine
their disagreements with federal constitutional law to those cases in
which state constitutional decisions can be grounded in textual or

Erickson's dissent in Colorado v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 823 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting)
(urging the majority not to depart from United States Supreme Court doctrine "without principled
reasons for doing so").
98. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
99. Consistent state and federal rulings are crucial to the rational development of
criminal law and the guidance of our law-enforcement officials. Only a strong state
purpose would justify divergence in this very sensitive area. An examination of the
New Jersey Constitution, statutes, and cases reveals no such purpose, and in fact
leads to the conclusion that adoption of the Leon and Sheppard limited good faith
exception is consistent with New Jersey law.
!d. at 141, 519 A.2d at 866 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Houston,
42 Cal. 3d 595, 624, 724 P.2d 1166, 1185, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 160 (1986) (Lucas, J., dissenting),
focusing on the law enforcement needs in this area:
As a general rule, I take exception to basing holdings such as this on independent
state constitutional grounds where the language of the applicable provisions is almost
identical to the federal Constitution, and without some greater showing of an
independent state interest needing additional protection. Any argument for such
holdings is further weakened in this case by the majority's failure to realize that the
guarantees of the [f]ifth and [s]ixth [a]mendments, which it invokes in its extension
of rights here, protect the rights of individuals accused or suspected of crimes. They
do not exist in the abstract to proscribe any police conduct of which the majority
disapproves.
!d.
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historical differences. The fact that state and federal texts are
parallel or even identical does not mean that the state constitution's
framers intended to incorporate federal constitutional law into their
own constitutions. . . . "Different men may employ identical language yet intend vastly different meanings and consequences."
Moreover, even if state and federal constitutional clauses are conceded to have identical meanings, state courts are not barred from
independently determining what those meanings are. The United
States Supreme Court simply has no monopoly over determining
what constitutes an "unreasonable search" or an infringement on
"freedom of speech." ' 00

Moreover, it is not at all clear that the lack of law enforcement
uniformity is creating a problem. Over the last twenty years there have
been considerable differences in the way state courts apply various rules
of criminal procedure, yet no hard evidence has been offered to show
that the result has seriously and adversely affected law enforcement on
a national level. 101
Some state judges have resisted vigorously applying state constitutional law. Grassroots movements have developed in a few of the sun
belt states. 102 Still, more and more state judges are looking to their own
state constitutional provisions prior to reviewing parallel federal standards.103 The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Houston 104
illustrates this broader approach to the application of state constitutional
law. The court there rejected the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Moran v. Burbine. 105 In Burbine, the Court held that "the police

100. Developments, supra note 44, at 1497 (footnote omitted) (quoting Falk, The Supreme
Court of California, 1971-1972: Forward-The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 282 (1973)).
101. See Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal
Procedure Rights and the New Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GoNz. L. REv. 221, 259 (1983):
Some concern has been expressed about the Jack of uniformity in the Jaw that would
result in the widespread use of state constitutional rights. It is unclear, however,
what serious problems this would create above and beyond the fact of diversity of
interpretations. Moreover, it is uncertain that any of the problems that might result
would outweigh the benefits of a revitalized state judiciary. As Professor Howard
has written in his lengthy review of State Supreme Court activities: "Both constitutional history and theory support the case for an independent body of constitutional
Jaw."
I d.
102. Florida and California have already enacted constitutional amendments which restrict the
ability of their state courts to take independent roles. See Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1154.
In a number of states, including Arizona, such proposals have recently been made and debated.
103. Brennan, supra note 41, at 551.
104. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
105. 475 u.s. 412 (1986).
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may conceal from a suspect the critical fact that his attorney is trying
to reach him if the attorney is not physically present at the station.'' 106
In Houston, the majority of the court began its decision by recognizing
that it was to be the court of last resort in explaining the meaning of
the state constitutional provisions, California's "Declaration of
Rights." 107 Recognizing that the Constitution of the United States
allowed states to give their citizens greater individual rights than given
by the federal constitution, the court noted that "state charters offer
important local protection against the ebbs and flows of federal constitutional interpretation." 108 The court conceded that clear United
States Supreme Court rulings were entitled to "respectful consideration":
But they are to be followed in California "only where they provide
no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law."
In appropriate cases we have forthrightly rejected adherence to
United States Supreme Court precedent, even where it was necessary
to overrule our own prior decision adopting the federal rule. 109

Moreover, the court declared that its state constitution was not designed
simply to track federal constitutional provisions or to rely on such
provisions. Hence, an independent review of the state constitution was
mandated:
The debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1849 made quite
clear that the language of the Declaration of Rights which comprises
Article I of the California Constitution was not based upon the
federal charter at all, but upon the constitutions of other states.
When the 1849 Constitution was adopted, of course, the 14th
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, by which certain federal
constitutional rights have been applied to the states, did not yet
exist. Indeed, a reading of both the 1849 and 1878 constitutional
debates reflects a common understanding that it was the state
constitution, and not the federal, which would protect the rights of
California citizens against arbitrary action by the state. 110

The court in Houston recognized the contrary federal holding dealing
with defendant rights. By looking principally to state constitutional
provisions, the court adopted a different and more expansive rule for

106. 42 Cal. 3d at 614, 724 P.2d at 1177-78, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
107. ld. at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
108. ld.
109. Id. at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 609 n.l3, 724 P.2d at 1174 n.13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.l3 (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original).
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California actions, a rule reflecting the unique values and history of a
sovereign state. 111
V.

THE ARizONA EXPERIENCE

The application of purely state constitutional law to criminal cases
has been sparse in Arizona. Those few cases which have been resolved
by the state supreme court on state constitutional grounds have not
been of particular significance. Arizona cases contrast with those in
other states which have rejected the good faith exclusionary rule
exemption of the Leon case, 112 the broad Gates affidavit validity test, 113
the narrow view of the rights of criminal defendants with respect to
their attorneys, 114 and the United States Supreme Court's inventory
search ruling. 115 Instead, the Arizona experience has been relatively
moderate, narrow in application, and fairly limited in impact, for the
Arizona courts have simply not dealt with these broader questions. 116
This limited application is somewhat surprising, as Arizona is a state
where the equivalent fourth amendment language is considerably different from that found in the United States Constitution. Article 2,
§ 8 of the Arizona Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed
in his private affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law." 117
This language is more specific than that found in the fourth amendment
and-at least arguably-requires more governmental deference. In
Arizona, specific constitutional reference is made to "private affairs," a
phrase not present in the federal constitution.ll 8 Still, few cases have
focused on the state constitution's privacy protection. Three principal
cases have been decided, all in the last decade, which rely explicitly on
state constitutional grounds.

111. The Florida Supreme Court recently followed the California lead in rejecting Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987).
112. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
113. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
114. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
115. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). Numerous other cases could also be
discussed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987) (dog's "sniff
search" for drugs is search under state constitution); State v. Dixson, 87 Or. App. 1, 740 P.2d
1224 (1987) (search of home, under state constitution, includes curtilage outside of house).
116. Thus, it is especially ironic that a political movement has apparently begun in Arizona
to restrict the use of the state constitution to a level not to exceed that found in the federal constitution. See Carson, Petition Drive to Seek Constitutional Amendment for Victim's Rights, Ariz.
Daily Star, Aug. 30, 1987, § B, at 5, col. 1.
117. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8.
118. Jd.
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State v. Bolt119 involved an appeal from the denial of a suppression
motion where the defense claimed that the police had "secured" the
defendant's house prior to obtaining a search warrant. Apparently the
practice of securing the premises was a common one in which police
entered a residence without a warrant (and without any emergency or
exigent circumstances), rounded up occupants, and simply waited for
an officer to arrive with a warrant. No one was allowed in or out of
the premises during this waiting period. The Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that federal law on this point was not clear. 120 The Bolt
court focused exclusively on whether such an entry violates article 2,
§ 8 of the Arizona Constitution. The court spoke in somewhat expansive
terms about the heightened level of protection offered by the Arizona
Constitution:
While we are cognizant of the need for uniformity in interpretation,
we are also aware of our people's fundamental belief in the sanctity
and privacy of the home and the consequent prohibition against
warrantless entry. We believe that it was these considerations that
caused the framers of our constitution to settle upon the specific
wording in Article 2, § 8. While Arizona's constitutional provisions
generally were intended to incorporate the federal protections, they
are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a
right of privacy .121

Because of the wording of the Arizona Constitution, as well as the
history and development within the state, the court found that officers
could not make a warrantless entry unless an emergency situation were
present. Such entries were held to be "per se unlawful" under the state
constitution. 122 With no showing that any exigent circumstances existed,
the court held that the police procedure violated the Arizona Constitution wholly "independent of federal authority." 123 On this point the
court was unanimous. The disagreement resulted from the question of
whether the court should follow the federal rule of exclusion (which
would not suppress the evidence here because of an independent source
exception) or whether a separate state exclusionary rule, under the

119. 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984).
120. After discussing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Bolt court noted that
no majority of justices in Segura dealt with the crucial question of whether a "warrantless entry
and inspection short of search is permitted by the [f]ourth [a]mendment absent exigent circumstances." 142 Ariz. at 264, 689 P.2d at 523.
121. 142 Ariz. at 264-65, 689 P .2d at 523-24 (citation omitted).
122. /d. at 265, 689 P .2d at 524.
123. /d. This came within the confines of the "independent state ground" principle set out in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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Arizona Constitution, should be enforced. 124 The court, having decided
that Arizona law specifically prohibited the police conduct, seemed
poised to make a broad and expansive ruling concerning the particular
remedy available under the state constitution:
While the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule
approved by the Supreme Court ... is a matter of federal law, we
are certainly free to adopt a state version of the exclusionary rule
that differs from the federal, so long as we do not fall below the
federal standards. We could, therefore, under the appropriate circumstances, refuse to recognize the independent source exception
as a matter of state law, even though it was recognized as a matter
of federal law . 125

The court moved slowly even though it conceded that "on occasion
we may not agree with the parameters of the exclusionary rule as
defined by the United States Supreme Court." 126 Instead, Justice Feldman, for the majority, argued that it was important "to keep the
Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal." 127 The result was
a narrow holding, the majority stating: "the exclusionary rule to be
applied as a matter of state law is no broader than the federal rule." 128
The state supreme court took a somewhat more dramatic step toward
the application of purely state constitutional law in State v. Ault. 129 At
trial the defendant was convicted of burglary and child molestation. A
major piece of evidence consisted of shoeprints that were found in the
mud outside the victim's home. 130 When the police officers went to the
defendant's house to arrest him, the defendant specifically told them
they were not invited in. 131 Nevertheless, the police went inside, saw a
pair of muddy tennis shoes, and took them. 132 These shoes were later
used against the defendant because they matched the shoeprints found
at the victim's home. 133 No warrant had been obtained prior to the
seizure of the shoes. 134

124. Justices Cameron and Hays specially concurred, looking to a balancing test as opposed
to the flxed exclusionary rule. 142 Ariz. at 270, 689 P.2d at 529.
125. Id. at 268, 689 f.2d at 527.
126. Id. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528.
127. Id.
128. Id•
.129. ISO Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986).
130. Id. at 462, 724 P.2d at 548.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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One of the chief government arguments in Ault was that the shoes
had been properly admitted in evidence under the "inevitable discovery
doctrine,'' because they would have been seized pursuant to a search
warrant which was executed later in the day . 135 As a result, the state
contended the shoes were admissible. The supreme court disagreed,
stating that even though the United States Constitution and the Arizona
Constitution both proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government, and were both designed to deal with the unlawful entry
of homes, the "Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its
federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona
citizens. As a matter of Arizona law, officers may not make a warrantless entry into a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or
other necessity.'' 136 Although recognizing that the inevitable discovery
doctrine was established in Arizona, 137 the court refused to apply it to
a case in which an illegal search of the defendant's home directly
produced evidence against him. 138 The court once again noted that its
holding was based on a violation of article 2, § 8 of the Arizona
Constitution, and did not need to be consistent with the position the
United States Supreme Court might take:
While our constitutional provisions were generally intended to incorporate federal protections, they are specific in preserving the
sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.... We strongly
adhere to the policy that unlawful entry into homes and seizure of
evidence cannot be tolerated. The exceptions to the warrant ·requirement are narrow and we choose not to expand them. No exigent
circumstances existed to allow a warrantless entry into defendant's
home. 139

In the third case, double jeopardy, not fourth amendment rights were
at issue. In Pool v. Superior Court, 140 the defendant claimed that his

135. Id. at 463, 724 P.2d at 549. The court relied on Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
where the Supreme Court allowed the discovery and condition of the body of a murdered child
to be admitted in evidence "because its discovery was found to be inevitable in spite of the fact
that the location of the body was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights."
150 Ariz. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551.
136. 150 Ariz. at 463, 724 P .2d at 549 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551 (citing State v. Castenada, 150 Ariz. 382, 724 P.2d 1 (1986)).
138. Id. at 465, 724 P.2d at 551.
139. Id. at 466, 724 P.2d at 552 (citation omitted). The dissent vigorously disagreed with the
majority, arguing that there was "no explanation why the policy reasons in support of the
inevitable discovery doctrine should magically disappear at the door of 'King Gary's castle.' "
Id. at 468, 724 P.2d at 554 (Cameron, J. dissenting)
140. 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984).
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double jeopardy rights had been violated. 141 A new indictment had been
filed after the defendant's motion to dismiss had been granted at trial. 142
The case was an unusual one with the trial judge granting the defense
motion for a mistrial on the ground of improper conduct on the part
of the prosecutor.'43 Still, the trial judge denied a double jeopardy
motion, relying on United States Supreme Court precedent to the effect
that no constitutional error occurs if the prosecutor had not intended
to provoke a mistrial. 144 A unanimous state supreme court disagreed
with the result, finding constitutional error. 145 This holding directly
conflicted with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Oregon v.
Kennedy 146 where the Court found no double jeopardy problem because
of the trial judge's finding that there was no prosecutorial intent to
provoke a mistrial. 147
The Arizona court once again explained that under the state constitution, article 2, § 10, the court would "ordinarily interpret [state law]
in conformity to the interpretation given by the United States Supreme
Court to the same clause in the federal constitution.'' 148 Once again,
though, the court refused to find the United States Supreme Court's
decisions binding even with language that was quite similar to the
federal constitution:
We acknowledge, with respect, that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have great weight in interpreting those provisions
of the state constitution which correspond to the federal provisions.
We acknowledge that uniformity is desirable. However, the concept
of federalism assumes the power, and duty, of independence in
interpreting our own organic law. With all deference, therefore, we
cannot and should not follow federal precedent blindly . 149

With this policy rationale in mind, the court had little difficulty in
adopting the dissenting opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy and holding that
jeopardy attaches under Arizona's article 2, § 10 when a mistrial is

141. Id. at 104, 677 P.2d at 267-68.
142. I d. at 105, 677 P .2d at 269.
143. The prosecutor was angered by the defense and engaged in cross-examination in which
"portions [were] only arguably proper and still others (were] irrelevant and rather prejudicial ....
[T]he cross-examination [then] moved from the irrelevant and prejudicial to the egregiously
improper." /d. at 101, 677 P.2d at 264.
144. Id. at 104, 677 P.2d at 267.
145. Id. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271.
146. 456 u.s. 667 (1982).
147. Id. at 671.
148. 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271.
149. Id. (citing Kennedy, 295 Or. at 268-72, 666 P.2d at 1322-24).
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granted because of improper activities by the prosecutor. The Pool
court further wrote that prejudice to the defendant is present if the
government conduct "is not merely the result of legal error, negligence,
mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole amounts
to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and
prejudicial. ... " 150
There are few additional cases beyond Bolt, Ault, and Pool that are
of much significance. 151 It can fairly be said that in Arizona the cases
that are sharply different from federal law and which rely exclusively
on the state constitution in resolving criminal questions are of recent
vintage, few in number, and relatively mild in application. Unlike the
experience in several other states such as California, Florida, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Colorado, Arizona's
constitutional provisions have not been given much notice, either by
counsel arguing in criminal justice cases, or by the state courts.
VI.

THE

W AVB

OF THE FUTURE?

We have seen a tremendous and dramatic change in recent years in
the way in which many state supreme courts view their own state
constitutional law provisions in criminal justice cases. Many state justices have taken the strong position espoused by Justice Mosk of the
California Supreme Court: "The federal constitution merely sets the
floor for individual rights. State and international charters are free to
prescribe the ceiling." 152 Judge Newman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with this proposition: "The
resurgence of the spirit of the Old Federalism affords new opportunities
for the vitality of our state constitution. We have every right to expect
it to have increased significance.'' 153

150. !d. at 108-09, 677 P.2d at 271-72.
151. There have been other important cases, but these are opinions which either do not differ
substantially from federal Jaw or do not particularly emphasize the language of the Arizona
Constitution.
152. Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CAL. LAW. 100 (1987).
153. Newman, The 'Old Federalism': Protection of Individual Rights by State Constitutions
in an Era of Federal Courts Passivity, 15 CoNN. L. REv. 21, 28 (1982). See also Developments,
supra note 44, at 1356:
The duty to protect individual rights, a duty that both our federal structure and
their own constitutions impose on the states, requires that state courts not regard
their constitutions as mere mirrors of federal protections. The distinctive characters
of state constitutions and state judiciaries reinforce the demand that state constitutional interpretation not merely follow the federal lead.
/d.
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With such strong and widespread support for the state constitutional
law movement, it would seem as if the state constitutional law express
cannot be derailed. Still, one must have some pause before jumping
fully on this train of optimism. Quite a number of courts have; up
until this time, viewed their state constitutional provisions as essentially
equivalent to the federal constitutional rules and have refused to substantively distinguish them. 154 Moreover, when a few courts have moved
too quickly in enforcing state constitutional protections, the reaction in
the world of politics has been swift and harsh. In a few states there
have been movements to amend state constitutions to eliminate the
added protections of the state constitution for criminal defendants. The
two most prominent examples, of course, are Florida and California.
In Florida, the constitution was amended by initiative petition so that
the search and seizure clause "shall be construed in conformity with
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court." 155 In California, the limitation is
linked to the exclusionary rule. The California Constitution now states:
''Except as provided by statute . . . relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding. . . . "1s6
Even with this pause, however, it seems clear that more attorneys
will raise the issue 157 and more courts will look to the state constitution
for questions arising out of criminal prosecutions. There are, undoubtedly, historical bases for such a first inquiry regarding the state constitution. As former Justice Goldberg has pointed out, Alexander
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers remarked that the "one transcendent
vantage belonging to the providence of the state governments [is] the
ordinary administratioh of criminal and civil justice.'' 158 Moreover, if

154. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 1166-67.
155. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (amended 1982).
156. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28(d) (amended 1982). For detailed discussions of the enactment
of section 28(d) and its impact, see In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631 (1985) (compare the majority and dissenting opinions).
157. The statement made by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court is telling: "I
hope that in the future lawyers claiming a violation of fundamental rights will always discuss the
relevance of the state constitution. A lawyer who ignores the change in tide towards constitutions
runs the same risk as a sailor who ignores a change in the tides of the sea." Pollock, State
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 715 (1983).
158. Goldberg, Stanley Mask: A Federalist for the 1980's, 12 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 395, 396
(1985), referring to the statements in the Federalist Papers, No. 17. See also Note, supra note 81,
at 497:
Historically, the states' commitment to individual rights came first, as state bills of
rights predate the federal Constitution. By 1784, each of the original thirteen states
had adopted a constitution, and each of these constitutions contained provisions
guaranteeing individual liberties against government action. However, the constitu-
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the Rehnquist Court continues in the direction of the Burger Court and
views the criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court restrictively, 159
many judges will be inclined to look to state constitutional provisions
for a more expansive set of protections. 160 To be sure, from many
quarters there is considerable encouragement given to the state courts
to continue this revolution of the "Old (or "New") Federalism." The
foremost proponent is, without question, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, who has repeatedly encouraged just such activity:
This pattern of state court decisions puts to rest the notion that
state constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal
Bill of Rights. The lesson of history is otherwise; indeed, the drafters
of the federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions
and the various state constitutions. Prior to the adoption of the
federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the
federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more
state constitutions. 161

Ultimately, many courts throughout the country will be asking-first
and foremost-about their own state laws, declarations of rights, and
constitutions, apart from the words or impact of the federal constitution. This is as it should be. The state courts have primary responsibility
for reviewing their own state laws, and matters of criminal justice arise
typically under the state law. In short, I believe that Justice Linde of

tiona! guarantees were by no means uniform. During the months preceding independence, the idea of uniform constitutions was debated, but was rejected. Instead,
each state was left to write a constitution satisfactory to itself.
/d.

159. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
160. Professor Galie made the point well:
The Warren Court's "Bill of Rights Revolution" can be fairly described as spectacular. One might even hazard a guess that the startling evidence of public ignorance
of the Bill of Rights discovered in the forties has been dispelled. The fact is that
few individuals have heard of or know what protections their state bills of rights
contain. An examination of the scholarly literature on the subject finds the same
neglect. No doubt there is some justification for this neglect as most state legislatures
and courts have been acting for years as if these rights did not exist. Moreover,
given the Warren Court's preemption of the field with one precedent shattering
decision after another in the civil liberties area, there seemed to be little state courts
could do, and few were inclined to do anything more than snipe at the Supreme
Court or evade, where possible, the full impact of the court's decisions.
Galie, supra note 101, at 223.
161. Brennan, supra note 13, at 501. See also the statements made by former Justice Goldberg:
"In the era of the Burger Court, the responsibility of protecting individual liberties has fallen on
state courts. Some enlightened state jurists-such as Justice Mosk-have met the challenge. Others,
regretfully, have been slower to respond." Goldberg, supra note 142, at 401.
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the Oregon Supreme Court was correct when he identified the "right
question" to be asked by state judges in such cases:
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as
or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. The right question is what the state's guarantee means and
how it applies to the case at hand. The answer may tum out the
same as it would under federal law. The state's law may prove to
be more protective than federal law. The state law also may be less
protective. In that case the court must go on to decide the claim
under the federal law, assuming it has been raised. Courts are
resuming their responsibility for the constitutional law of their states.
As I have said, the questions for lawyers as well as judges is not
whether to do so, but how. 162

162. Linde, supra note 13, at 179.

